Senior Service College FELLOWSHIP PROJECT

JUNIOR OFFICER INSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP EDUCATION: IS THE BASIC OFFICER LEADERSHIP COURSE (BOLC) MEETING THE CHALLENGE?

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USAWC CLASS OF 2008

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1. REPORT DATE *(DD-MM-YYYY)*	**2. REPORT TYPE**	**3. DATES COVERED** *(From - To)*
01-07-2008	Civilian Research Project	

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Junior Officer Institutional Leadership Education: Is the Basic Officer Leadership Course (BOLC) meeting the Challenge?

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S)

COL David C. Hill, USA

5d. PROJECT NUMBER
R0532

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

The Institute of Advanced Technology
The University of Texas at Austin
3925 West Braker Lane, Suite 400
Austin, Texas 78759-5316

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
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Austin, Texas 78759-5316

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

DISTRIBUTION A: UNLIMITED

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
The views of the academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

14. ABSTRACT

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This paper discusses, analyzes, and makes recommendations about junior officer leader development in its Basic Officer Leadership Courses (BOLCs); BOLC I [West Point, Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), and Officer Candidate School (OCS)], BOLC II, and BOLC III with respect to the curriculum, standards, and resources. This paper concludes with recommendations on how to continue or improve junior officer leader development at Army institutions to meet the Chief of Staff of the Army's vision for future leaders.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			**17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT**	**18. NUMBER OF PAGES**	**19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON**
					Robert D. Riffle
a. REPORT	**b. ABSTRACT**	**c. THIS PAGE**			**19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER** *(include area code)*
UNCLASSIFED	UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFED	UNLIMITED	38	(512) 232-4560

USAWC CIVILIAN RESEARCH PAPER

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: COL David C. Hill

TITLE: Junior Officer Institutional Leadership Education: Is the Basic Officer Leadership Course (BOLC) Meeting the Challenge?

FORMAT: Civilian Research Paper

DATE: 28 March 2008 WORD COUNT: 9,669 PAGES: 38

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Junior Officers are finding themselves in situations in which their decisions have strategic consequences, not only for the Army but for the Nation. As an Army at war, it is imperative that we prepare these leaders for the challenges they will face in the complex environments in which they are expected to operate. Additionally, these junior Soldiers are the future leaders of our Army and Nation. Hence, it is paramount that the Army begins developing strategic leaders at the earliest opportunities.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This paper is the result of the author's Army War College Fellowship at the Institute for Advanced Technology at The University of Texas at Austin.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

JUNIOR OFFICER INSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP EDUCATION: IS THE BASIC OFFICER LEADERSHIP COURSE (BOLC)MEETING THE CHALLENGE?

Introduction—Why the Army Must Meet the Challenge of Junior Officer Institutional Leader Education

In a Harris Poll released 1 August 2007, military officers were ranked 5th out of 23 professions and occupations as the most trusted profession in America. With a rating of 52 percent, military officers were one of six professions perceived by greater than 50 percent of adults polled as having very "great prestige." In 1982, military officers received a rating of 22 percent and the trend since then has been upward, with 2007 as the highest rating to date.[1] The revelations of war crimes in Iraq jeopardizes the trust the American public has in its military and military officers and are, therefore; a serious strategic issue for the United States of America, the Army, and other service components. The gang rape and murder of a fourteen-year girl in Al-Mahmudiyah, the killing of twenty-four unarmed civilians in Haditha, the murder of eleven civilians in Ishaqi, and the three months of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib are examples of some of the reported war crimes committed by US Forces since its invasion of Iraq in early 2003.[2] These examples are in distinct contrast to the Army values and leadership requirements model. Furthermore, although each of these actions was at the tactical level, they have strategic consequences that impact national policy. Why did they occur? Where was the failure? In my opinion these atrocities were the result of failures at the junior officer level of leadership.

The Officer Education System (OES), specifically leader education and training, plays and will continue to play a critical role in preventing these types of events from occurring by providing leaders with the necessary knowledge and skills to be successful. It is critical that the Army meet the challenge of leader development for all leaders. There are three reasons that we must get this right. First, leadership at the junior officer level is more difficult today than it was 20 years ago. Technological advances, operations in urban and complex terrain, full spectrum operations, and excessive operational pace are

just some of the factors that make leadership more difficult today than ever before. Second, the future of our Army depends on good leadership at all levels. The leadership education of junior officers is the foundation upon which their life long learning journey is built. Good leadership also has a direct impact on recruiting and re-enlistment, which are both keys in an all-volunteer army. Finally, understanding leadership and leader development makes us better followers. Virtually every leader in the Army works for someone else and is simultaneously a leader and a follower. Great army units and organizations normally have a combination of competent leaders and capable followers working together to improve their organization. This paper examines how the Institutional Army is meeting that challenge of leadership education for its junior officers through the recently adopted Basic Officer Leadership Courses (BOLCs).

Background—Discussion of Current Views on Leader Development in the Army and Civilian Sectors

The Army is undergoing its greatest transformation since World War II while simultaneously executing the Global War on Terror (GWOT), sustaining other global commitments, and responding to disaster relief around the world. This ongoing Army effort involves transformation in the domains of doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). While one can argue that all these domains are critical to the success of transformation, in my opinion none are more important or complex than the domain of leadership and education. According to Barbara Benjamin, the associate director of Masters of Science in Organizational Leadership at Mercy College, the US Armed Forces were among the first organizations in post-Industrial Western society to recognize the need to redefine leadership in order to attract and retain outstanding personnel.[3] Not only is the leadership transformation critical for making the Army a more capable organization in today's complex security environment, it is also critical for recruiting and retaining quality Soldiers, another key strategic challenge for the Army. The United States Army is different than most organizations in the civilian sector. It has different goals, constraints, culture, and much higher consequences when things don't go right. What the Army and civilian organizations have in common is their reliance on leadership for making the organization what it is.

The Army leadership development model (Figure 1) is defined by three core domains that shape learning experiences throughout a career: institutional training and education, operational assignment, and self development.



Figure 1. The Army Leadership Development Model [FM 7-0]. [4]

These domains are dynamic and interconnected. It takes all three to develop competent, confident leaders. For newly commissioned officers, the institutional training and education domain is the foundation for lifelong learning. The Army's school system provides the education (what to know) and training (how to do) needed to perform their duties when they report to their first duty station. The operational domain includes unit training at home station, combat center training rotations, joint training, and operational deployments. The self-development domain eliminates the gap between institutional and operational training. In November 2005 the United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences prepared a report titled "Understanding, Predicting, and

Supporting Leaser Self-Development. Data was collected from 498 officers attending the Combined Arms Services Staff School during 2002 to measure individual characteristics and propensity to self-develop. Participants indicated they valued being a more effective leader but did not believe that self development in this area would actually lead to them becoming more a more effective leader. They were also less likely to believe they could successfully develop and conduct a personal leadership self-development program. The most common factors indicated for this were lack of time, job responsibilities, and balancing home/family responsibilities.[5] Given the increased operational tempo (OPTEMPO) since 2002, it is not likely or reasonable to expect junior officers to engage in significant self development of leadership skills. The Army must provide these skills and knowledge through the institutional and operational domains and cannot count on the self-development domain for learning.

When considering leadership as both an art and a science, think of the training aspect as the art of leadership and the education aspect as the science of leadership. If using football as an analogy, the playbook is the science. This is where the players learn the basic plays and schemes of the team, what fundamentals they need to know to make their team successful. Practice on the field and execution during games are the art. This is where the players learn how to execute the plays they learned and build upon the knowledge they gained from the playbook. A good football coach would never consider sending a player into the game unless he first had a thorough understanding of the playbook. The same is true for Army leaders. We should never send a Soldier into a unit without a solid education in leadership, specifically FM 6-22, which is the Army's leadership playbook.

Senior leaders in the Army, past and present, recognize the importance of leadership and leader development. Over the past century, the Army has looked at itself to measure its capabilities against future requirements about once a decade. Examples include: Elihu Root's reforms in 1902, which created General Service and Staff schools and established a school hierarchy for officers; the National Defense Act of 1920, which established Command and General Staff College (CGSC), the Army War College, Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC), and Branch/Service Schools; and most recently , the Army Training and Development Leader Panel (ATDLP).[6] On 1 June 2000,

the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric Shinseki chartered the ATLDP to study training and leader development. He said "Leadership is the most important thing we do in peacetime. Every day, we train soldiers and grow them into leaders."[7] General Shinseki understood that Army transformation and the emerging operational environment would have a significant impact on future leader development.

His successors also understand the importance of leadership and leader development. In 2004 General Peter Schoomaker, as the Chief of Staff of the Army, published a document titled "The Way Ahead." This document provided an overview of the Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG). This represented the Army senior leadership's vision of how the Army will fulfill its mission to provide necessary forces and capabilities to the combatant commanders in support of the national security and defense strategies. In the introduction, General Schoomaker stated:

> We must immediately begin the process of re-examining and challenging our most basic institutional assumptions, organizational structures, paradigms, policies and procedures to better serve our nation.[8]

The Way Ahead identified 17 focus areas to enable the Army to be more responsive as an instrument of national power. Leader Development and Education was one of the 17 focus areas.

After General George Casey assumed the duties as the current Chief of Staff of the Army, he published the 2007 Thematic Guidance in which one of his main messages was "Improve Leader Development."[9] The result of this guidance was Army Initiative 5 (AI5), Leader Development in the 21st Century Security Environment. This initiative is led by a panel consisting of: the Commanding General, Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth; the Commanding General, US Army Cadet Command; the Deputy Commandant, US Army Command and General Staff College; the Commandant, US Army Warrant Officer Career Center, the Commandant, US Army Sergeants Major Academy; and the Director, Civilian Development Office.[10] The mission of the panel is twofold. First, to examine and analyze "accelerating leader development programs to grow leaders for the strategic envi ronment"[11] in order to develop adaptive leaders through the incorporation of recommendations into the Army Campaign Plan. Second, to revise leader development programs for the 21st Century, synchronize programs with

Army Forces Generation (ARFORGEN), and ensure policies and procedures are in place to support AI5 and is a lifelong process. It is imperative that we lay the foundation with properly resourced and effective leader development at the very beginning of an officer's career.

The Army is not the only organization in America transforming its leadership development programs. The last two decades have also witnessed an increase on the emphasis of leader education in civilian organizations.[12] These organizations place more emphasis on leadership development now than in the past because they view good leadership as central to the success of the organization. The American Society of Training and Development (ASTD) reported that 60 percent of Fortune 500 companies surveyed in 1995 listed leadership development as a high priority-up from 36 percent in 1990.[13] One of the most noteworthy trends in the civilian sector during this period is the proliferation of leadership development methods.

Formal programs are one method of leadership development in civilian organizations. The backbone of most leadership development systems is the formal program. At a minimum, a formal program consists of a classroom seminar covering basic theories and principles of leadership. The classroom is the most frequent delivery method with approximately 85 percent of civilian companies using this venue to engage in leadership development.[14] These formal programs serve as the foundation for leadership development. Formal classroom leadership training is now complemented by leadership activities similar to the leader reaction courses that the military has used for years. Activities like coaching, mentoring, action learning, and 360-degree feedback sessions are also on the rise in civilian organizations.[15]

Leader competencies are a core dimension of leadership development activities in most civilian organizations. A recent benchmarking study found that leading-edge companies define leadership by a set of leadership competencies that guide leader development at all levels.[16] An important aspect with regard to designing the content of leadership development programs is figuring out what attributes or competencies are associated with future success.[17] Simply compiling lists of current knowledge, skills, and abilities for successfully developing leaders is not adequate. One reason organizations are moving towards leadership competencies is they are more focused on the future. What is

most important; however, is how the competencies drive the development of desired behaviors and outcomes.[18]

Dr. Steve Stanley, President of LEAD/Energy Leadership Seminars identifies two principles of leadership that are important to understand when thinking about leader development in the Army: 1) Leaders are made not born, and. 2) Leadership is a journey not a destination, a process not a program.[19] This is true of leaders both in the civilian sector and the military, but given the stakes, it is imperative that our junior officers joining the fight have a better understanding of leadership than ever before.

Recent/Ongoing Army Initiatives in Leader Development

The Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP)

The ATLDP convened on 12 June 2000 with an initial focus on training and leader development of commissioned officers. The panel task organized itself to form four study groups, an integration team, and a red team. Three of the study group's missions were to assess one the three pillars of the Army Leader Development Model (unit, institution, and self development). The fourth study group examined Army culture as it related to officer development, service ethic, and retention. The integration team provided various aspects of support to the panel to enable their efforts and the red team reviewed the panel's process and findings and provided real-time critical feedback. To gather their data, the four study groups traveled around the world and conducted surveys and interviews with more than 13,500 leaders and spouses around the Army.[20] The Panel released study results from this initiative on 25 May 2001. The most significant finding with respect to leader development was that officers were concerned that the Officer Education System (OES) did not provide them the skills to be successful in full spectrum operations.

Basic Officer Leaders Courses (BOLCs)

One of the initiatives to transform the OES was the full implementation, in June 2006, of BOLC. This initiative includes officers in the Active and Reserve Components and is a three-phase program designed to produce commissioned officers in the United States Army that are competent with leadership skills, small unit tactics, and branch specific skills. The phases emphasize the warrior training and leadership development to meet the Army's needs in the GWOT and for the future conflicts. The first phase, BOLC I, is the pre-commissioning phase and includes training at the United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point, Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC), and Officer Candidate School (OCS). Lieutenants who receive direct commissions and do not go through any of these pre-commissioning courses attend the Direct Commission Course (DCC), which is their equivalent to BOLC I. These courses are designed to train basic Soldier and leader tasks performed by all lieutenants regardless of commissioning source. After commissioning, all officers attend the second phase, BOLC II, at Fort Benning, Georgia, or Fort Sill, Oklahoma. This phase is considered the initial-entry, field-leadership phase designed to teach branch-immaterial courses in unit leadership and tactics. The final phase of this transformation, BOLC III, is the branch technical phase designed to train lieutenants in the specialized skills, doctrines, tactics, and techniques of their basic branch. The typical officer will attend the BOLC phases in sequence from I-III.

There are 85 approved BOLC common core tasks on the approved task list which are included in the curriculum of all phases of BOLC. These tasks are broken down into four tiers:

Tier I	critical task–must train
Tier II	important task–train
Tier III	not as important–but train if time available
Tier IV	not appropriate–do not train

Each task is assigned a code that dictates the type of training for each task. There are four codes that can be assigned to a task.

P–program training	Is listed on the POI with prescribed number of hours, specific learning objectives and concludes with an evaluation of proficiency or knowledge.
I–integrated training	Conducted with other training. These subjects do not usually appear on the training schedule as separate entities.
A–awareness training	Can be accomplished by briefings, operations, handouts, posters by the chain of command to increase knowledge or awareness of subject.
R–refresher training	Reinforces or reviews important skills; frequency left to commander's discretion.[21]

Of the 85 tasks, 12 of them focus on topics specifically discussed in FM 6-22, *Army Leadership*. All 12 tasks are Tier I and considered program training for BOLC I and integrated training for BOLCs II and III on the BOLC Common Core Critical Task List. A significant number of other tasks are nested with concepts from FM 6-22.

FM 6-22, Army Leadership

Another recent initiative was the publication the Army's newest field manual on leadership, FM 6-22, *Army Leadership*, in October 2006 which replaced FM 22-100. Many of the same definitions and concepts from 22-100 are unchanged with the publication of FM 6-22. For example, the definition of leadership did not change, the manual still emphasis the *Be, Know, Do* methodology of leadership, and the three levels of leadership. Some changes include added emphasis to the Warrior Ethos, leader roles, leader development, leader teams, and ethical reasoning. The manual also modified the framework for attributes and competencies.

The Army Leadership Requirements model (Figure 2) provides a basis for thinking and learning about leadership and associated doctrine and centers on what a leader is and does. The three key interrelated properties of this model are values based leadership, impeccable character, and professional competence.[22]



Figure 2. Army Leadership Requirements Model [FM 6-22].[23]

As the capstone manual for leader development and leader education, FM 6-22 clearly defines leaders, leadership, leadership levels, leadership roles, and how to develop leaders in the Army. There are three levels of leadership identified in the manual: direct, organizational, and strategic. Company-grade officers generally serve in the direct level of leadership. Good direct-level leadership on the battlefield can and will make the difference in preventing atrocities like those discussed earlier in the paper. Company commanders and platoon leaders are at the tip of the spear in both Iraq and Afghanistan. These young leaders are finding themselves in situations where their leadership and the decisions they make, on the battle field and in training, affect the lives of their Soldiers, non-combatants, and Americans back at home. All of these are keys to winning the GWOT.

FM 6-22 also identifies eight core leader competencies and supporting behaviors (Figure 3). These competencies should be studied in pre-commissioning and initial entry training courses to establish the baseline for lifeline learning.



Figure 3. Eight core leader competencies and supporting behaviors [FM 6-22].[24]

According to FM 6-22, Soldiers develop their leader competencies from a balanced combination of institutional schooling, self development, realistic training, and professional experiences. During the Cold War, officers had more time to develop these competencies, where the stakes were not as high for slow learning or failure. Today, many young officers deploy with their units Iraq or Afghanistan immediately upon graduation from BOLC III or the Captains Career Course (CCC). It is more imperative than ever that the institutional schools provide them leadership education early in their careers.

The Army Leader Development Program

This initiative is the most recent Army initiative on leader development. General Casey, Chief of Staff of the Army, and Honorable Pete Geren, Secretary of the Army, established and signed this program into effect on 1 November 2007. It established the Training and Doctrine Command Commander as the single responsible official to direct the Army Leader Development Program.[25] One of the key outcomes of centralizing this

responsibility should be the synchronization of the various initiatives for leader development. This program is in its infancy and its impact on leader development at all levels is still unknown.

Discussion of Leader Development Curriculum, Standards, and Resources

Officer Education System (OES)

The OES is the heart of the institutional training and education domain of the Army leadership development model for officers.

> The goal of the OES is to produce a corps of leaders who are fully competent in technical, tactical and leadership skills, knowledge and experience; are knowledgeable on how the Army runs; are prepared to operate in joint, integrated, and multinational environments; demonstrate confidence, integrity, critical judgment, and responsibility; can operate in an environment of complexity, ambiguity, and rapid change; can build effective teams amid organizational and technological change; and can adapt to and solve problems creatively.[26]

> Officers undergo their transition from a civilian to military lifestyle in what AR 350-1 refers to as Initial Military Training (IMT). Also referred to as Initial Entry Training (IET), the Army considers all Pre-commissioning programs, BOLC II and BOLC III of the OES as officer IET.[27]

BOLC I

The majority of newly commissioned lieutenants receive their first phase of BOLC training through various pre-commissioning programs. They receive this training through ROTC programs at major universities and colleges, USMA, OCS or the Direct Commissioning Course (DCC). The goal of all these programs is to produce officers with basic leadership skills and a general knowledge of how to be an officer.

USMA

The mission of USMA is "to educate, train, and inspire the Corps of Cadets so that each graduate is a commissioned leader of character committed to the values of Duty, Honor, and Country, and prepared for a career of professional excellence and service to the Nation as an officer in the United States Army."[28] The "*West Point Experience*" is designed to prepare cadets for leadership as commissioned officers on

active duty in the United States Army. It is a 47-month process which provides for the intellectual, military, physical, moral-ethical and social development of cadets. The academy exists for no other purpose.[29]

In addition to taking Military Leadership classes centered on FM 6-22, all cadets must take PL300 Military Leadership. This is a 40-lesson class taught during a cadet's junior year. The course's purpose is to inspire in cadets the motivation to develop an informed, systematic, and dynamic approach to leading in the Army and begin the process of lifelong leader development. There are three primary goals of the course. First, cadets understand the origins of their personal leadership style and are inspired and able to pursue self-development and leader growth throughout their career. Second, cadets understand and can apply relevant human and organizational behavior concepts to their multiple leader roles as an officer. Third, cadets are capable of integrating new knowledge, experience, and reflection to lead more effectively in a culturally diverse and changing environment.[30]

ROTC

The mission of the US Army Cadet Command (USACC) is to commission the future officer leadership of the US Army and motivate young people to be better citizens.[31] USACC has oversight of the 173 ROTC programs located at colleges and universities throughout the United States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico with an enrollment of more than 20,000 cadets.[32] The curriculum for all ROTC programs is standardized and managed through the Cadet Command blackboard, an online resource, which posts approved classroom lesson plans and slides for use by instructors at the various ROTC programs in the formal education of the cadets. Military Science is taught as an electives to the cadet's normal degree program. The foundation of the Army ROTC Military Science and Leadership (MSL) curriculum is the BOLC common core task list. These tasks represent the competencies a second lieutenant needs to have upon arrival to their first unit. There are four MSL courses that are sequential and progressive and normally track from freshman through senior year. Each course is organized into five tracks: leadership, personal development, values and ethics, officership, and tactics and techniques. MSL I and II courses are considered basic courses and the MSL III and IV Courses are considered advanced courses.[33] Among the leadership topics studied by

cadets throughout these courses are the *Be, Know, Do* leadership philosophy, Army Values, the Warrior Ethos, the Soldiers Creed, team building, leadership traits and behaviors, and elements of leadership.

In addition to formal leadership instruction, ROTC provides plenty of opportunities for cadets to apply these concepts in field environments. Contracted cadets participate in weekly leadership labs, must participate in supervised physical training and maintain Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) standards, and ROTC battalions conduct a minimum of two 24-hour field training exercises (FTXs) per school year. The most important aspect of the ROTC program is cadet participation, normally between MSL III and MSL IV years, in the 33-day Leader Development and Assessment Course (LDAC) known as Warrior Forge. This replaced what was commonly called "ROTC Summer Camp." The purpose of Warrior Forge is to evaluate a cadet's potential as an officer and to validate specific skills taught on individual campuses.

Cadets in all ROTC programs receive instruction out of the same course manuals published specifically for Army ROTC. There are different manuals for each MSL level. The current editions of these manuals are dated 2006 and still refer to FM 22-100 as the Army capstone Leadership Manual. According to LTC Boris Robinson, Professor of Military Science at The University of Texas ROTC program, these manuals are being updated next year to reflect the changes brought about in FM 6-22.

OCS

The Army's OCS is designed to teach candidates basic leadership skills and Soldier tasks. Today, OCS is offered through both Active and National Guard officer candidate courses. Active-duty OCS is taught at Fort Benning, Georgia, and graduated 1,820 officers in FY 2007.[34] National Guard OCS is state-sponsored, but the United States Army Infantry School (USAIS), Fort Benning, Georgia, is the proponent for ARNG OCS. Fort Benning has the responsibility to act as the accreditation authority for all ARNG OCS programs. ARNG OCS is taught in three phases, primarily because of time limitations. Individual states conduct Phases I and II on the weekends for a year. Fort Benning conducts Phase III as a two-week resident training course. Beginning with the first class in FY 2008, active OCS was shortened from 14 weeks to 12 weeks to allow for more classes per year. Additionally, the class size was increased from 160 to 172

candidates to meet the commissioning needs of the Army. The candidates at Fort Benning receive leadership instruction from the Combined Arms and Leadership Division (CALD) located within the Combined Arms and Tactics Directorate (CATD) in the United States Army Infantry School. Although CALD's title includes "leadership" there is no leadership instructor authorized for this division. In 2005, the Chaplain assigned to CALD was responsible for teaching leadership to the candidates. In 2006, the 11th Infantry Regimental Commander (School Brigade) at Fort Benning assigned an "excess" infantry captain whose primary responsibility was leadership instruction. Currently, a branch-qualified Quartermaster officer is assigned the duties as the leadership instructor in CALD. There are 69.5 hours of leadership instruction during OCS dedicated on the Program of Instruction (POI) for "leadership" education broken out as follows[35]:

The Basis of Leadership	4 hours
The Army Values	12.5 hours
Eight Core Competencies	4 hours
Leadership Roles, Levels, Teams	4 hours
Ethics	8 hours
Counseling, Coaching and Mentoring	37 hours

The leadership instructor at Fort Benning provides instruction in only 12 hours of these classes. The Infantry School chaplain teaches the 8 hours of ethics and platoon training officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) provide the remainder. In addition to the formal POI, the platoon training officers and NCOs provide personal mentorship to candidates.

DCC

In addition to ROTC, USMA and OCS, the chaplain corps, medical professions, and Judge Advocate General (JAG) corps can assess lieutenants into the Army through direct commission. For Direct commission officers (DCO), BOLC I consists of a four-week course at Fort Benning, Georgia, or Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The purpose of this course is to provide these officers, who have little or no previous military training or experience,

the opportunity to receive training on the skills necessary to continue to BOLC II. The DCC is task centric. Topics include first aid, conducting foot march, basic rifle marksmanship, and an introduction to military planning. At Fort Benning, there is no specific leadership "education" for officers attending the DCC.[36] Fort Sill has one hour on army values in their POI.[37] This course also targets captains and majors transitioning to the Army from other branches of service.[38] Fort Benning and Fort Sill graduated approximately 215 officers in FY 2007 and expects to graduate approximately 360 in FY 2008.[39]

BOLC II

Regardless of commissioning source, nearly all lieutenants attend BOLC II, the second phase of their basic officer education. Doctors and chaplains are the only branches that do not currently participate. BOLC II is a tough, branch immaterial, seven-week training course offered at Fort Benning, Georgia, and Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The basic goal of BOLC II is to teach leadership in a combat-simulated environment. All officers receive instruction on combatives, basic rifle marksmanship, classroom training on modern Army equipment, convoy operations (to include a convoy live fire exercise), dismounted land navigation, advanced rifle marksmanship, US weapons, urban operations, and forward operating base operations.[40] There are no formal classes for leadership in the BOLC II POI; however; all training events integrate leadership common core tasks and cadets must satisfactorily perform in two leadership positions.[41] Additionally, platoon mentors schedule "platoon trainers time" several hours a week so they can talk to their lieutenants in an informal setting about different experiences to include leadership. A recommendation to improve the quality of leadership education in BOLC II was to fill the platoon mentor positions with 100 percent branch qualified captains in accordance with the table of distribution and allowances (TDA).[42]

BOLC III

The third phase of BOLC, commonly referred to as the Officer Basic Course (OBC) for each branch, is designed to train lieutenants to perform their wartime duties as commissioned officers. During this phase, they learn the specifics of the systems and interfaces they will train and fight in and on. Each lieutenant attends BOLC III at his

specific Training and Doctrine Command schoolhouse or training center. For many, this is the first introduction to their branch. One of the impacts of BOLC II was the reduction of time officers spend in BOLC III. These courses now range between six to 15 weeks. Upon graduation from BOLC III, officers attend follow-on functional courses, assignment oriented training, or report to their first units. BOLC III questionnaires received from nine different branch schools, which included responses from both instructors and students, range from several schools with zero formal leadership education using FM 6-22 on the POI to less than 10 hours on the POI. While some leadership topics were taught, not all of them used FM 6-22 as the basis of instruction.

> Very little "programmed" instruction on leadership occurs in our BOLC course. However, leadership is one of our key lines of operation as we integrate this facet during other programmed instruction including 35 of our 85 days being a field environment. I would argue most of the "programmed leadership instruction should occur at BOLC I/II while we integrate this training into our branch specific instruction at BOLC III.
>
> —anonymous BOLC III cadre member

This idea that lieutenants should receive leadership "education" prior to arrival at BOLC III was a common theme from all the branch schools. A number of respondents indicated that lieutenants would receive leader training during BOLC II. One BOLC III student did not believe receiving leadership classes would benefit him because he already received it during BOLC I and his belief is that a person cannot learn leadership through reading. It is something that is learned by doing and practicing.

Several of the branch schools recognized their responsibility to provide students leadership training and situational awareness of Army, its programs and leaders above what is in the POI. These schools had mentorship programs for BOLC III students designed to complement the training in the POIs and provide the junior officers different perspectives of the Army as a profession. Mentorship activities involved professional development programs, panels, and interaction between senior Army leaders, students from the Captain's Career Courses and the BOLC III Students.

Recent Feedback from the Field

The Center for Army Lessons Learned, located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, released a report in August 2007 in support of the current Army initiative to accelerate change in leader development. Students attending the Officer Basic Course (OBC)/BOLC III and the CCC completed the survey after graduation and reported on how well their most recent school course prepared them for various aspects of leader and professional development. Figure 4 is an extract from a table contained in the report and reports areas of favorable development in the OBC/BOLC III and the CCC and compares data collected in 2000 to data collected in 2007. This table was compiled from data collected by both the Center for Army Leadership (CAL) and the Army Research Institute (ARI).

	OBC	**OBC/ BOLC**		**CCC**	**CCC**
	2000[1]	**2007[2]**		**2000[1]**	**2007[2]**
Sampling Error +/-	3.8	4.0		6.1	2.7
To what extent did the most recent school/course completed . . .					
prepare you for successful leadership?	58%	63%		59%	67%
prepare you to perform your current leader tasks?	54%	61%		50%	66%
contribute toward your professional development?	76%	67%		82%	83%
instill Army values?	50%	61%		41%	59%
instill the Warrior ethos?	**[3]	61%		**	54%
instill the Joint mindset?	**	56%		**	66%
prepare you to work with people from other cultures?	**	62%		**	68%
prepare you for your future assignments?	56%	62%		75%	75%
prepare you to perform your current duties?	56%	52%		57%	63%
prepare you to perform your wartime duties effectively?	52%	61%		66%	71%
prepare you to perform multinational contingency missions?	23%	**		40%	**
prepare you to perform stability and security missions?	**	54%		**	63%
prepare you to adapt to changes in mission during deployed operations?	**	62%		**	70%
prepare you to adapt to changes in the adversary's tactics during deployed operations?	**	61%		**	66%
provide instruction to meet the standards set for the course/school?	**	79%		**	86%

[1] Percentages reported in 2000 for course most recently completed in 1999-2000
[2] Percentages reported in 2007 for course most recently completed in 2006-2007
[3] ** = Question not asked for that year

Figure 4. CAL and ARI Course Survey

Fort Leavenworth, in conjunction with Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), also conducted Leader Development, Training and Education Surveys of instructors and training developers at seven branch schools as a part of their pre-accreditation and accreditation visits. Major areas of concerns from the majority of the respondents include: lack of instructors, lack of support personnel for admin and training development tasks/functions, instructor stabilization, and impact of taskings on instructors.

Curriculum and Standards

Analysis

While the tasks in all phases are BOLC are determined by the BOLC Common Core Critical Task List and are nested throughout all phases, the task(curriculum), conditions, and standards vary significantly and this has an impact on the level of leadership proficiency of lieutenants. Two key differences with respect to conditions and standards these differences involve time and references.

There is great disparity in the time spent in leader education between cadets at USMA, on one end of the spectrum, to direct commission officers attending the DCC on the other. It is simply unrealistic to expect a college-option lieutenant commissioned through OCS in twelve weeks to have the same baseline of leader training as cadets who attend USMA or ROTC for four years. As discussed earlier, direct commission officers receive no leadership education during their four-week DCC. Without any empirical evidence, other than personal experience through attendance at ROTC summer camp and Officer Basic Course, there are also significant differences in the 173 ROTC programs throughout the country. Some are simply better than others based on location, funding, cadre, and support of the school. Subsequently, cadets receiving commissions from the various ROTC programs are not all up to the same standard. The result is that lieutenants arriving for training at BOLC II have very different levels of mastery and understanding of leadership. Since the curriculum for BOLC II and III both integrate this type of training, there is little room for officers to catch up with their peers except through informal programs such as mentoring or through self-development.

The Army published FM 6-22 as the capstone leadership doctrine manual in October 2006 and this should be the cornerstone of all leadership training but it is not. Not all pre-commissioning sources or branch schools are using current leadership doctrine, FM 6-22, for the basis of their instruction even though it has been over 16 months since the Army published the new manual. ROTC, which commissions the largest proportion of lieutenants, still uses books referring to FM 22-100, the outdated leadership manual. As a result, some of the principle changes in FM 6-22 discussed earlier were not taught to ROTC students graduating in 2007 and 2008. Their leadership baseline knowledge is going to be different from lieutenants graduating from USMA or OCS. Furthermore, unless they engage in self development and read FM 6-22 on their own they will not get this education in BOLC II or BOLC III because there is no programmed leadership education on the BOLC common core critical task list.

Accessions command determines the requirements for leadership education for all BOLC phases and prepares the BOLC Common Core Critical Task List, which assigns level of importance and training method for each task. The table below contains the leadership specific tasks from the Common Core Critical Task List. All of these tasks are Tier I tasks with programmed training conducted during BOLC I and integrated training during BOLC II and III.

Table I. Extract of Leadership Tasks from BOLC Common Core Critical Task List

TIER	Task	Task Number	BOLC I	BOLC II	BOLC III
I	2. Apply the Essential Elements of Army Leadership Doctrine to a Given Situation	158-100-1110 Detainee Opns	P	I	I
I	3. Resolve an Ethical Problem	158-100-1134 Detainee Opns	P	I	I
I	4. Apply Leadership Fundamentals to Create a Climate that Fosters Ethical Behavior	158-100-1135 Detainee Opns	P	I	I
I	5. Take Charge of a Platoon	158-100-1282	P	I	I
I	6. Identify Duties, Responsibilities, and Authority of Officers, Warrant Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and DA Civilians	158-100-1183	P		
I	7. Counsel Subordinates	158-100-1260	P	I	I
I	8. Apply Ethical Decision Making Process at Small Unit Level	158-100-1230	P	I	I
I	10. Motivate Subordinates to Improve Performance	158-100-1150	P	I	I
I	11. Motivate Subordinates to Accomplish Unit Mission	158-100-1250	P	I	I
I	12. Develop Subordinate Leaders in a Platoon	158-100-1271	P		
I	17. Identify Ways National, Army, and Individual Values and Professional Obligations Relate to Each Other	158-100-1132	P	I	I
I	20. Communicate Effectively as a Leader	158-100-1240	P	I	I

The only clear exception is with those officers attending the Direct Commission Courses at Fort Benning and Fort Sill. These officers do not receive any specific leadership education during their four week BOLC I course. Time is the major limiting factor. While there are not a large number of officers who fall into this category, they should not be excluded from leadership education. These chaplains, medical professionals, and lawyers will find themselves in situations where their leadership skills, or lack of leadership, can make a difference.

While the majority of the BOLC questionnaire respondents at the branch schools responded they had enough time allocated on the POI for leadership education during all phases of BOLC, the CAL and ARI course surveys (Figure 4) tell another story. In 2007, 41 percent of officers surveyed did not feel BOLC III prepared them to perform their current leader tasks. This same percent of officers (41 percent) did not feel BOLC III instilled the Army Values or Warrior Ethos in them. Just over half (52 percent) felt OBC prepared them to perform their current duties. These are some of the basic leadership

tasks for BOLC I–III. This is a great concern as the majority of these officers may soon find themselves leading platoons in combat, faced with tough moral and ethical dilemmas where their leadership skills will be critical. One of the key points of the goal for OES was to develop officers who are confident. With 48 percent of the officers who participated in the survey feeling they were not prepared to perform their current duties the question is: "how well are we as an institution doing at meeting the OES goals for junior officers?"

Recommendations

There are a several recommendations for improving the curriculum and standards with respect to leadership education. First, the Army needs to enhance and standardize all Army leadership education outcomes for BOLC I. Second, the Army should require all cadets in universities and colleges to take a leadership class as an elective to their degree plan. Third, the Army needs to develop a leadership distributed education course that all lieutenants must take prior to BOLC II. Fourth, the Army needs to streamline the process to incorporate new doctrine into its POIs and lesson plans so we are teaching current doctrine as soon as it is published. Finally, all branch schools should be encouraged to incorporate mentorship programs into their BOLC III programs to continue educating leaders on leadership education.

Enhance and standardize all leadership education outcomes for BOLC. With BOLC I being the only BOLC OES course where leadership education is programmed training, it is critical that we provide all lieutenants with a minimum level of leadership education. Education that provides them confidence in their abilities to lead their platoons, understand Army Values and the Warrior Ethos, and how to counsel coach and mentor their subordinates. In order to accomplish this task Accessions Command must get feedback from cadre and students during all phases of BOLC to determine the leaderships skill and knowledge set that the Army wants all officers graduating from BOLC to possess upon completion of each phase. Outcomes are more important than the specific tasks. Given these survey results at each phase, Accessions Command must conduct annual assessments of the BOLC Common Core Critical Task List and make appropriate changes to the task list to make sure that the Army is meeting these outcomes. Lieutenants departing BOLC III with a level of confidence greater in the 52-67

percent range in leadership areas indicates the Army is not providing the right education under the current system.

Require all ROTC contract cadets in universities and colleges to take a leadership class as an elective to their degree plan. There is more to leadership education than what is found in FM 6-22. In addition to their training on military leadership, cadets attending USMA take a leadership class which teaches them leadership theory as well as about their own personal leadership styles. This puts them at a distinct advantage to their peers, at least initially, and boosts their own confidence. Requiring all ROTC contract cadets to take an undergraduate leadership class as an elective will significantly expand their own knowledge of leadership theory and teach them about their own personal leadership styles which will benefit the Army and the individuals. This also puts them on a level comparable to their peers graduating from the USMA.

Develop a leadership distributed education course that all lieutenants must take prior to starting BOLC II. Regardless of the efforts to standardize the curriculum for BOLC I, there is still disparity in the level of comprehension of leadership education. Additionally, officers attending the DCC have no programmed training on leadership education in their four week course. To ensure all lieutenants, regardless of commissioning source, have a common baseline for leadership education, which will be enhanced by the integrated training they will receive in BOLC II and BOLC III, a distributed leadership education module will bring all lieutenants to a minimum common level of leadership education competence. The course should cover all aspects of Army leadership. Upon completion, lieutenants will print a certificate of completion which they should provide to cadre upon in-processing to BOLC II. For those cadets who already have a mastery of the required leadership skills, there should be an option for testing out of the module by taking the examination up front. Officers arriving at BOLC II without the perquisite course should be required to complete the course prior to starting BOLC II. This course does not add requirements for branch schools as the responsibility will be on the officer to complete the training on his or her own time prior to arrival to BOLC II.

Streamline the process to incorporate new doctrine into its POIs and lesson plans. There is no reason why, two years after publication of new doctrine, all precommissioning sources and branch schools should not be teaching current doctrine. The Army needs to look at the entire process to incorporate new doctrine into its POIs and lesson plans. One of the biggest challenges to accomplishing this is the lack of qualified personnel to update POIs and lesson plans. The process to develop new doctrine itself is cumbersome, but this presents an opportunity for training developers of the organization responsible for writing the new doctrine to simultaneously develop lesson plans that should be available immediately upon the publication of the doctrine. With respect to ROTC, while the concept of having separate textbooks for each of the MS levels which that incorporates doctrine standardizes the instruction across all schools, this technique makes updating the manual when doctrine changes even more cumbersome. Another effect of using these textbooks is that it does not force cadets to read and become familiar with the Field Manuals and Army Regulations that will guide them when they receive their commissions. Cadets should learn from the manuals that are the capstone documents for the Army and not textbooks developed by Cadet Command to teach the different levels of Military Science.

Incorporate mentorship programs into BOLC III. Mentorship programs are an outstanding method of continuing the life-long learning process with respect to leadership education. These programs not only benefit the lieutenants, but also the noncommissioned officers, captains and field grade officers who serve as mentors. They provide opportunities to lieutenants to learn from non-commissioned officers and officers who have been in platoons and understand what it takes to lead at that level. Mentorship programs should augment formal POI instruction and the opportunities for learning at all levels are endless.

Resources

Analysis

By far the biggest hindrance to providing quality leadership education to BOLC students is the lack of qualified instructors. Across the board, every school participating in the accreditation conducted by Center for Army Lessons Learned and questionnaires distributed in support of this paper cited this as a primary challenge. The Army is stretched thin and in order to support the GWOT, the Institutional Army is not being resourced at levels to meet the demands of training, educating, or resources training. In the TRADOC Active Component Manning Guidance published 25 April 2007, TRADOC predicted the potential of a 5,000 Soldier shortfall based on Headquarters Department of the Army manning guidance.[43] Falling into the category of "Remainder of Units," meaning TRADOC can expect a fair share of what is left after *deployers* and *priority missions* are filled. Within TRADOC manning guidance for officer as training base instructors is priority three with a minimum goal of 70 percent of authorizations.[44] TRADOC manning guidance for noncommissioned officer as training base instructors is also priority three with fill based upon a fair-share distribution methodology in accordance with available Army inventory.[45] The impact of this manning strategy is that OES is understaffed across the board and this is having a negative impact on all aspects of officer education, not just in the leadership education arena. One course of action that was considered but not recommended was to eliminate BOLC II if we are unable to staff this course. Give the time and instructors back to the branch schools and require them to train those skills previously taught in BOLC II. This is not a viable course of action for two reasons. First, with the current manning guidance from TRADOC, instructors gained from eliminating BOLC II would not necessarily be cross leveled to the branch schools. Instead they would be put back into the fight and branch schools would have more requirements with the same or less resources. Second, the experience that lieutenants gain in BOLC II working with fellow officers from all the branches can not be replicated by stove piping this training in the branch schools.

Recommendations

There are no easy solutions to this dilemma, but there are some recommendations to ease the strain in the short term. First, it is imperative that pre-commissioning sources and all branch schools conduct a thorough review of POIs to ensure all instructor positions are captured. Second, branch schools should ensure that all instructor positions are properly coded on their TDAs. Third, offer instructor positions to captains who are considering leaving active duty. Fourth, fill vacant active component positions with Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) instructors. Fifth, cross train instructors to be able to conduct instruction across all specialties. Sixth, stabilize instructors for a minimum of two years on the platform. Finally, make sure instructor certification programs are in place in every institution so that the instructors that are assigned are trained on current doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures.

Conduct a thorough review of POIs to ensure all instructor positions are captured. Authorized instructor positions are directly tied to the POI for each course. In order to ensure that all instructor positions are captured on the POI schools must first document the force structure and workload to determine the resources (instructors) need to meet the training standard of school POIs. While this may not result in actual instructors being assigned, it will validate increases in requirements, which will impact manning levels in the short term. If organizations do not accurately capture requirements then they may be shorting themselves instructors inadvertently.

Ensure that all instructor positions are properly coded. Not all instructor positions on the TDA are equal. Instructors with a code of “XT” are manned at a minimum of 70 percent while those not coded “XT” are manned upon a fair-share basis which may be less than 70 percent. Instructor positions on the TDA are normally titles as Instructor/Writers. These positions are earned through the annual Structure Manning Decision Review (SMDR) process which is why it is imperative that all organizations fully engage in the process by conducting thorough reviews of their POIs. Approved Instructors will be coded on the TDA as described below.

"Military instructors will be identified by Personnel Remark Code "XT." The ASI "5K" for Officers, SQI "8" for Warrant Officers, and SQI "8" for Enlisted will also be used to identify military positions. Skill/grade levels should be in compliance with Standards of Grade."[46]

Offer instructor positions to captains who are considering leaving active duty. With the high number of captains leaving active duty, offering them instructor positions at the school of their choice may be an incentive for retaining some of these experience officers. They should agree to remain on active duty for a period of two to three years with the guarantee that they will not be deployed during that period. It is possible that these officers may change their minds and continue active duty service when their instructor commitment is up. This is a *win-win* situation for the schools, officers, families and the Army. These officers should not be counted against the 70 percent fill for instructors, otherwise the schools will be no better off.

Fill vacant active component positions with Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) instructors. The Individual Ready Reserve is a pool of available resources which can be tapped into to fill critical instructor shortages within TRADOC. Many of these officers and noncommissioned officers are combat veterans who have valuable experience which can be brought into the classroom where they will have a positive impact on junior officers.

Cross train instructors. Instructors at branch schools no longer have the luxury of being specialist in just one area. They must be capable of instructing outside of their basic branch of expertise, they must be pentathletes in the truest sense. The cost is to allow these instructors time to become subject matter experts on all areas they are expected to instruct.

Stabilize instructors for a minimum of two years on the platform. Branch schools invest a lot of time and effort into preparing an instructor for the platform. External taskings and re-assignment of instructors is detrimental to the quality of instruction. It also reduces the likelihood that officers will compete and volunteer for these type of assignments. It is imperative that the Army assign and stabilize instructors for at least two years to enable them to become subject matter experts on their instruction

material. This incentive may also attract high quality instructors who are looking to stabilize their families after numerous deployments.

Make sure instructor certification programs are in place in every institution. Instructor certification is more critical now that ever before. With the shortage of senior captains and field grade officers across the Army branch schools can expect to get instructors who have not completed key and developmental positions. Non career course graduate captains may be the norm vice the exception in command positions and within the Institutional Army. These programs should focus on how to teach, provide updates on the contemporary operational environment (COE) and review recent changes to doctrine.

Conclusion

The US Army is rated as one of the most trusted professions in America because its mission is important and the men and woman who fill the ranks are among the best and brightest in America. Their leadership skills and expertise are unmatched by any other institution in America. This is one of the major reasons civilian organizations seek veterans for employment. The Army is truly a leadership laboratory and although Soldiers learn and improve everyday, the Army can do better when it comes to preparing our junior officers for the awesome responsibility of leading America's most precious resource, its sons and daughters, in combat.

If the Army is serious about improving leader development it must start by committing the necessary resources to accomplish this important mission. The major resource area of concern for BOLC is instructors. These instructors are on the front lines in a very different battlefield than Iraq or Afghanistan, but their mission is just as important. As a former commandant at the Infantry School would say "your importance to the Army is not measured by your proximity to the battlefield." The Army must prepare its junior officers in BOLC to face the challenges on today's complex battlefield. Preparation goes beyond ensuring the Army resources instructors. The Army must also ensure it is preparing them to the same standard for leadership education using current and relevant doctrine.

If the Army doesn't make changes soon the impacts could be felt for years. The junior officers of today are the future senior leaders of our Army. There are many lieutenants in the Army today with the potential to become the Chief of Staff of the Army. It is the Army's responsibility to prepare them for continued served and success. It begins with a foundation in leader education and that starts with BOLC.

Potential areas or issues for further research include an examination of the Army's Captain's Career Course, Warrant Officer Education System, NCOES, and civilian leadership programs to determine if we are meeting the challenge in these areas.

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